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TOWARDS A MORE REALISTIC VISION OF CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY THROUGH THE LENS OF THE LEXMERCATORIA

JonathanBellish*
Globalization has led to a shift in power away from states and
towards the private sector, which has resulted in multinational
corporations taking a place among the most powerful international
actors. This phenomenon has had many positive consequences, but it
has also resulted in human rights, labor, and environmental abuses in
developing nations. Such abuses are inconsistent with the way these
multinationals behave at home and have led to a subsequent call for
increased corporate social responsibility ("CSR') through enforceable
norms. Though there is substantial agreement as to the contents of CSR
norms, there is little such accord where enforcement is concerned. Some
have suggested that binding CSR norms will ultimately emerge from
multinational corporations themselves along the lines of the lex
mercatoria. This article seeks to counter that argument by suggesting
that, even if the traditional narrative of the lex mercatoria is true-an
assertion upon which considerable doubt has been cast-modern
multinational corporationsare not likely to take the lead in developing
and enforcing such norms. This is because, while lex mercatoria norms
tend to increase profits and reduce liability, CSR norms tend to shrink
margins and expose corporations to an additional form of liability.
From this assertion, the article concludes that political and
macroeconomic developments are likely to overtake legal and normative
developments, particularlythose emanatingfrom the corporate suite, in
leading to corporate responsiveness to a broader community of
stakeholders.
I. INTRODUCTION
When an American court hears a medical malpractice tort claim, it
applies the professional standard of care to the doctor's actions to
* Jonathan Bellish, 2012 J.D. graduate of the University of Denver, Sturm College of
Law, with certificates in public and private international law from The Hague Academy of
International Law. I would like to thank my family and friends for their support, with a
special thanks to Kathryn for her tireless help and thoughtful suggestions throughout the
drafting process. Finally, I would be remiss to forget Professor Ved Nanda who continues
to be an invaluable mentor.
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determine liability.I This standard requires the court to look into the
prevailing practice of doctors who are similarly situated to the
defendant to determine whether or not the doctor-defendant was
negligent in a particular case.
Centuries from now, when legal
historians look back at the widespread application of the professional
standard of care as applied to doctors in the United States of America,
they are unlikely to conclude a multi-state, American lex doctoria
created independently binding legal norms governing a doctors'
treatment of patients, despite the prevalence of different state courts
using the doctor's custom to determine legal liability. Rather, these
historians will conclude that twenty-first century courts applied the
legal standard of reasonableness, looking into the custom of doctors as
factual matter to support their legal argument, as was indeed the case.
Yet the existence of mercantile custom and the explicit insertion of
that custom into medieval mercantile disputes have led to the
conclusion that there was an international lex mercatoria that created
independently binding legal obligations. Some scholars have even gone
so far as to use the concept of the lex mercatoria to characterize norms
of corporate social responsibility ("CSR"). This paper argues that, even
if the prevailing characterization of the lex mercatoria is historically
accurate, an extension of this characterization to norms of corporate
social responsibility is unfounded. To characterize corporate social
responsibility norms as a new lex mercatoria is to ignore the
stubbornness of the shareholder primacy model of the corporation as
well as the practical effects of CSR norms on a given corporation.
Where actual implementation is concerned, market-driven CSR
norms have been the most successful in shaping corporate behavior.
This is mainly because multinational corporations find themselves
outside the reach of home country laws, 2 host country laws, 3 and
international law. These corporate actors generally adhere to the

1. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 766.102(1) (2012) (defining the professional standard of care
as: "The prevailing professional standard of care for a given health care provider shall be
that level of care, skill, and treatment which, in light of all relevant surrounding
circumstances, is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably prudent similar
health care providers."); Bearce v. Bowers, 587 S.W.2d 217, 218 (Tex. App. 1979), (citing
Bowles v. Bourdon, 219 S.W.2d 779, 785 (Tex. 1949)) ("In order for this [medical
malpractice] suit to have reached the jury, Bearce was required to present competent
evidence by a doctor of the same school of practice as Dr. Bowers that the treatment
complained of was negligence . . . . Therefore it was necessary for Bearce to establish
through a medical expert a professional standard of care so the jury could determine
whether Dr. Bowers' treatment deviated from that standard so as to constitute negligence
or malpractice.").
2. "Home country" refers to the country where the multinational corporation is
incorporated.
3. "Host country" refers to the country in which the multinational corporation
operates.
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shareholder primacy model of the corporation in which managers' only
goal is to maximize shareholder returns. Some scholars view the
success of market-driven CSR norms to suggest that the larger world of
corporate social responsibility is properly seen as a new lex mercatoria.4
Under this characterization, CSR norms will become so widespread that
they crystallize into independently binding legal norms later applied by
government-sanctioned courts.5 The application of modern marketdriven CSR norms, as well as the respective natures of lex mercatoria
and CSR norms more broadly, makes it unlikely that this optimistic
phenomenon will materialize.
Because ancient lex mercatoria norms fall directly in line with a
corporation's desire to maximize profits and minimize liability and CSR
norms tend to cut into profits and expose the corporation to new forms
of liability, the marketplace embraced the former but will reject the
latter to the extent that it impedes shareholder value. Nonetheless,
exploring the contrast between the lex mercatoria and corporate social
responsibility remains a useful exercise. Such exploration helps to
illuminate both the need for binding CSR norms and the fact that such
norms are more likely to come from the broader international
community than from within the executive suite.
Part II describes the varying interpretations of the lex mercatoria
and ultimately characterizes it as a blank canvas upon which scholars
and commentators may paint their own desires for the concept. Part III
describes the history, evolution, and enforcement mechanisms for
establishing corporate social responsibility norms, as well as their
respective merits and shortcomings. Part IV looks at the application of
market-driven CSR norms and concludes that, though they have been
the most successful in coercively binding corporations to norms of
corporate social responsibility on a large scale, such market-driven CSR
norms are better explained by the shareholder primacy model of the
corporation than a deviation from that model in favor of social
responsibility. Market-driven CSR norms tend to emerge in the
presence of a consumer base that explicitly values corporate social
responsibility over low price, in the wake of an egregious and widely
publicized CSR atrocity, or both, and as such are likely to be adopted by
4. See Reza Banakar, Reflexive Legitimacy in International Arbitration, in
EMERGING LEGAL CERTAINTY: EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON THE GLOBALIZATION OF LAW 347,
374-79 (Volkmar Gessner & Ali Cem Budak eds.,1998); Joe W. Pitts III, Corporate Social
Responsibility: Current Status and Future Evolution, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 334,

357 (2009); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Soft Law, Hard Markets: Competitive Self-Interest and
the Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Multinational Corporations, 33
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 933, 951 (2008). But see Eric Engle, Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR): Market-Based Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 40
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 103, 118-20 (2004).

5. See sources cited supra note 4.
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a small minority of corporate actors. Part V argues that, because of a
dubious historical foundation and opposite financial and economic
consequences, CSR norms are not likely to develop along the supposed
lines of the lex mercatoria. Instead, Part VI asserts a continued need
for the international community to develop coercive, binding CSR
norms to deal with the worst abusers and suggests that macroeconomic
and political developments are likely to overtake legal developments
and in the creation of binding CSR norms. Part VII concludes.
II. THE BLANK CANvAs THAT IS THE LEXMERCATORIA
Lex mercatoria,or "the law merchant," refers to a set of mercantile
customs that began voluntarily within the merchant community but
eventually crystallized into binding norms.6 The concept of the lex
mercatoriais one of the most obscure concepts in international law. In
fact, only two certainties surrounding the lex mercatoriaand its history
truly exist. The first certainty is that "[i]nternational trade is in some
measure a constant thing."7 The story of the lex mercatoria has its
roots in medieval Europe, but it is a matter of historical fact that the
Europeans traded with the Arabs during the Crusades and "before the
Arabs came the Romans, and before the Romans the Greeks, and before
the Greeks the Phoenicians."8 As long as human beings have been able
to travel across borders they have engaged in international commerce.
The second certainty is that cross-border merchants had a set of
customs through which they dealt with one another, and this set of
customs became known as the lex mercatoria. Indeed, the concept of lex
mercatoriais recognized in The Hague and Vienna Conventions on the
International Sale of Goods9 and is explicitly incorporated into the
United States' Uniform Commercial Code. 10 More recently, the concept
of lex mercatoria has played a central gap-filling role in international
arbitration." The application of lex mercatoriais seen as preferable to
national law because of the uncertainty and one-sidedness inherent in
6. Christine Stammel, Back to the Courtroom? Developments in the London
ReinsuranceMarket, in EMERGING LEGAL CERTAINTY, supra note 4, at 84-85.
7. WYNDAM ANSTIS BEWES, THE ROMANCE OF THE LAW MERCHANT: BEING AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW WITH SOME
ACCOUNT OF THE COMMERCE AND FAIRS OF THE MIDDLE AGES 1-2 (Fred B. Rothman & Co.
1986).

8. Id. at 2.
9. Berthold Goldman, The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law - the Lex
Mercatoria, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 113, 113
(Julian D.M. Lew ed., 1987); Karyn S. Weinberg, Equity in InternationalArbitration:How
Fair is 'Fair'? A Study of Lex Mercatoria and Amiable Composition, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J.

227, 229 (1994).
10. U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (2011) ("Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this
chapter, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant. . .
11. Weinberg, supranote 9, at 252.
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the latter. 12
These two certainties, the existence of ancient
international trade and the fact that a body of law came to govern that
trade, are clear, but drawing a logical connection between these
certainties and characterizing that connection has proven to be highly
problematic. Attempts over many centuries to characterize the lex
mercatoria have been so disparate that the concept has essentially
become a blank slate upon which scholars and practitioners project
their beliefs about the nature of international trade and the regulation
of such trade.

A. The Character of Lex Mercatoria
The centuries-old debate surrounding the lex mercatoria has been
riddled with ambiguities regarding the definition, importance, contents,
and current state of the concept.
1. DefinitionalAmbiguity
An American court has defined the concept not as a set of laws, but
rather principles and custom that result from "general convenience"
and "a common sense of justice."' 3 One scholar defined lex mercatoria
as the sum total of customary international law, interstate, and state
law relating to international trade. 14 Still another views it as a set of
general principles of commercial law, which operates in a similar
fashion as "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" as
described in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice. 15
2. Ambiguity in Attributed Importance
With such definitional ambiguity, it should come as no surprise
that there is disagreement regarding the importance of the lex
mercatoria. On one end of the spectrum lies the notion that lex
mercatoria is an inexorable part of transnational commercial law
because domestic laws were not written with international trade in
mind and are too deeply intertwined with a national culture, history,
and values system to serve as the governing principles for international
relationships.16 On the other end of the spectrum lies the belief that lex
mercatoriasimply does not exist as a historical matter.' 7
12. Id.
13. Bank of Conway v. Stary, 200 N.W. 505, 508-09 (N.D. 1924).
14. Goldman, supra note 9, at 113.
15. Ole Lando, The Lex Mercatoriain InternationalCommercial Arbitration,34 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 747, 749-50 (1985).
16. Tom Carbonneau, The Remaking of Arbitration: Design and Destiny, in LEX
MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT 36 (Thomas
E. Carbonneau ed., rev. ed. 1998).
17. Georges R. Delaume, The Myth of the Lex Mercatoriaand State Contracts, in LEX
MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION, supra note 16, at 130-31.
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3. Diverging Lists of the Lex Mercatoria'sElements
The prevailing wisdom among scholars is that it is impossible to
produce an exhaustive list of the elements making up the lex
8
mercatoria.1
However, this has not stopped such scholars from
attempting to do so. Some lists are relatively short, 19 and some are
quite long, 20 but, in the end, any purportedly complete, substantive list
18. E.g., Lando, supra note 15, at 749.
19. Note, General Principles of Law in International Commercial Arbitration, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1826-33 (1988) (listing elements of lex mercatoria as: 1. A sovereign
government may make and be bound by contractual agreements with foreign private
parties; 2. The corporate veil may be pierced to prevent a beneficial owner from escaping
contractual liability; 3. Force majeure justifies non-performance of a contract such that
the loss is borne fairly by the parties; 4. Contracts that seriously violate bonos mores or
international public policy are invalid; 5. Equitable compensation constitutes the primary
remedy for damages; 6. The right of property and of acquired vested rights is generally
inviolable-a State may not effect a taking without equitable compensation; 7. A party
may not receive unjust enrichment).
20. The Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Michael Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: The First
Twenty-five Years, in LIBER AMICORUM FOR THE RT. HON. LORD WILBERFORCE 174-77
(Maarten Bos & Ian Brownlie eds., 1987) (listing the elements of lex mercatoria as: "1. A
general principle that contracts should prima facie be enforced according to their terms:
pacta sunt servanda. The emphasis given to this maxim in the literature suggests that it
is regarded, not so much as one of the rules of the lex mercatoria, but as the fundamental
principle of the entire system; 2. The first general principle is qualified at least in respect
of certain long-term contracts, by an exception akin to 'rebus sic stantibus.' The
interaction of the principle and the exception has yet to be fully worked out; 3. The first
general principle may also be subject to the concept of abus de droit, and to a rule that
unfair and unconscionable contracts and clauses should not be enforced; 4. There may be
a doctrine of culpa in contrahendo; 5. A contract should be performed in good faith; 6. A
contract obtained by bribes or other dishonest means is void, or at least unenforceable. So
too if the contract creates a fictitious transactions designed to achieve an illegal object; 7.
A State entity cannot be permitted to evade the enforcement of its obligations by denying
its own capacity to make a binding agreement to arbitrate, or by asserting that the
agreement is unenforceable for want of procedural formalities to which the entity is
subject; 8. The controlling interest of a group of companies is regarded as contracting on
behalf of all members of the group, at least so far as concerns an agreement to arbitrate;
9. If unforeseen difficulties intervene in the performance of a contract, the parties should
negotiate in good faith to overcome them, even if the contract contains no revision clause;
10. 'Gold clause' agreements are valid and enforceable. Perhaps in some cases either as
gold clause or a 'hardship' revision clause may be implied; 11. One party is entitled to
treat itself as discharged from its obligations if the other has committed a breach, but
only if the breach is substantial; 12. No party can be allowed by its own act to bring about
a non-performance of a condition precedent to its own obligation; 13. A tribunal is not
bound by the characterization of the contract ascribed to it by the parties; 14. Damages
for breach of contract are limited to the foreseeable consequences of the breach; 15. A
party which has suffered a breach of contract must take reasonable steps to mitigate its
loss; 16. Damages for non-delivery are calculated by reference to the market price of the
goods and the price at which the buyer has purchased equivalent goods in replacement;
17. A party must act promptly to enforce its rights, on pain of losing them by waiver. This
may be an instance of a more general rule, that each party must act in a diligent and
practical manner to safeguard its own interests; 18. A debtor may in certain
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of the contents of lex mercatoriais likely to be more reflective of the list
creator's perspective than the lex mercatoriaitself.
4. Differing Conceptions of the Lex Mercatoria'sCurrent State
The uncertainty that shrouds lex mercatoria also extends to the
current state of the concept as well. One scholar sees the lex mercatoria
primarily as an historical concept now controlled by positive law and
accordingly "well settled." 21 Others see it as an ever-present, everevolving concept. 22 And still another views it as a complete illusion. 23
In sum, there is virtually no agreement surrounding the lex mercatoria,
as reflected in the concept's definition, importance, substantive
contents, and current state. There is similar discord surrounding the
lex mercatoria'shistory.
B. The History of Lex Mercatoria
To the extent that there is any common wisdom surrounding the
history of lex mercatoria,that wisdom says that it came about in Italy
in the central part of the Middle Ages and was founded on Roman and
canon law. 24 Then, around the turn of the seventeenth century,
European courts began to recognize a "novel principle"; mercantile
custom could actually create an independent, binding legal obligation
irrespective of relevant positive law. 25 Thus, what once was voluntary
custom became binding law in and of itself. There are, however,
credible and widely read historical accounts that both extend and limit
this prevailing historical narrative.
1. Extending the TraditionalNarrative
One historical characterization extends the traditional narrative
around the lex mercatoria by asserting that it pre-existed the middle
ages and began at least as early as the writing of the Hebrew Bible.
Bewes's The Romance of the Law Merchant first advanced this view.26
Bewes believed that by the time medieval Europeans began to
incorporate the lex mercatoria into their own customs, that body of
mercantile custom was already "centuries standing" in the Arab
circumstances set off his own cross-claims to extinguish or diminish his liability to the
creditor; 19. Contracts should be construed according to the principle ut res magis valeat
quam pereat; 20. Failure by one party to respond to a letter written to it by the other is
regarded as evidence of assent to its terms").
21. See FILIP DE LY, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND LEX MERCATORIA 208 (1992).
22. Id, at 213 (describing the work of Berthold Goldman).
23. Keith Highet, The Enigmaof the Lex Mercatoria,63 TUL. L. REV. 613, 623 (1989).
24. BEWES, supra note 7, at 1.

25. J. H. Baker, The Law Merchant and the Common Law Before 1700, 38
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 295, 295-98 (1979).
26. BEWES, supra note 7, at 2.
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world.27 Bewes uses both historical accounts and the prevalence of
Arabic in the English language of commerce as evidence of medieval
European trade with the East,28 and he uses the first certainty
surrounding the les mercatoria- that "[i]nternational trade is in some

measure a constant thing" - as evidence that mercantile customs long
pre-existed such trade. 29 Bewes goes so far as to ask whether it was not
possible that "the practice of insurance existed [in ancient times] but
left little trace," 30 but ultimately resigns himself to the notion that,
while the West is indebted to the East for some of its mercantile law,
"how much [it] shall perhaps never know." 31
2. Questioning the Extent of the Traditional Narrative

Another, more tempered, conception of the lex mercatoriaquestions
the traditional narrative by suggesting that different cultures
recognized the concept at different times. According to this version of
the lex mercatoria, Medieval Northern Europeans were familiar with
the term, but sixteenth century Italian Merchants were not. 32 While
the proponent of this argument cited many Northern European
references to lex mercatoria as such, he was unable to find a single
reference to lex mercatoriain Benvenuto Stracca's De mercatura,which

is as surprising as it is revealing. 33 Written in 1553, De mercaturais
thought to be the first comprehensive treaty on commercial law. 34 If
the lex mercatoriawas as important and omnipresent as the prevailing
narrative suggests, it almost certainly would have been mentioned in
the seminal sixteenth century European treatise on commercial law.
This is especially true when one considers that an Italian wrote this
treatise, whose countrymen supposedly played a crucial role in the lex
mercatoria'sdissemination throughout Europe. 35 More basically, crossborder universality is an integral characteristic of the lex mercatoria.
Thus its notable absence in De mercatura calls into question lex
mercatoria'sexistence more generally.
3. Denying the TraditionalNarrative

The final historical characterization of the lex mercatoriatakes the
opposite position of Bewes's and argues that the lex mercatoria is
27. Id. at 8.
28. Id. at 10.
29. Id. at 1-2.

30. Id. at 63.
31. Id. at vi.

32. Charles Donahue, Jr., Medieval and Early Modern Lex Mercatoria:An Attempt at
the ProbatioDiabolica,5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 21, 27 (2004).

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 27-28.
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essentially an historical fiction propagated by those seeking to
romanticize the merchant class. One scholar notes that "[m]uch early
writing on the [lex mercatoria] was characterized by an ideological,
almost mystical zeal. It was advocatory rather than descriptive or
analytical."3 6 In fact, the Right Honourable Sir Richard Atkin, in his
Forward to Bewes' Romance of the Law Merchant lamented that
merchants were not associated with notions of romance and celebrated
Bewes's book's potential to "not only create an interest in the past, but
give a vision of the romance that attends the commerce of the
present."37
One scholar took a purely historical approach to the issue and came
to the conclusion that the lex mercatoria,as understood today, is mostly
the product of legend.3 8 According to this author, the lex mercatoria
was not a body of mercantile laws but rather an expedited process
utilized by men who understood the inefficiencies of traditional courts
and mutually agreed to avoid those inefficiencies. 39 He bases this
argument on, inter alia, an examination of the oldest English treatise
on lex mercatoria,published in the late thirteenth century, which states
that the only difference between lex mercatoriaand the common law are
the speed of the process, the liability of pledges to answer, and the
denial of wager of law as a means of establishing a negative. 40
According to this scholar, the lex mercatoria did not create any new
obligations, but was merely a convenient way to discharge pre-existing
obligations. 41 Contrary to the popular narrative, "[m]ercantile customs
were either local facts [to be proved as such] or they were the common
law of England," and the speedy procedural aspects of the lex
mercatoriawere never adopted by English courts. 42
Upon an examination of the debate surrounding the nature and
history of the lex mercatoria,the concept seems more like a Rorsach test
where scholars and practitioners project their own views of
international commercial law than a concrete historical and sociological
phenomenon from which similarly concrete lessons may be drawn. The
lex mercatoriacan be a millennia old mercantile tradition still operating
as the central animating force of international commercial law today,
an historical relic of mercantile convenience with no contemporary
relevance, or anything in between. Depending upon what one wishes to
36. Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, Lex Mercatoria-Hoistwith its Own Petard?, 5 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 67, 68 (2004).
37. The Right Honourable Sir Richard Atkin, Forwardto BEWES, supra note 7, at iv.
38. See Baker, supra note 25, at 320-22.
39. Id. at 300, 303.
40. Id. at 300 (discussing LEX MERCATORIA as printed in THE LITTLE RED BOOK OF
BRISTOL 57-58 (F. B. 'Bickley ed., Bristol 1900, vol. 1)).
41. Id. at 303.
42. Id. at 321.
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assert about the lex mercatoria, he or she can find a plethora of
scholarly and legal writing to support that preferred position.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Unlike the lex mercatoria, the principle of corporate social
responsibility ("CSR") has both a clear history and relatively
straightforward contents. The debate surrounding CSR instead lies in
how the international community can ensure that corporations live up
to the widely agreed upon principles of corporate social responsibility.
More than any single incident of corporate misbehavior, macroeconomic
forces accompanying globalization led to the widespread acceptance of
the need for workable CSR norms. Between 1990 and 1997, the amount
of capital spent abroad increased by over five hundred percent. 43 This
increase came largely as a result of the proliferation of information
technology and its ability to allow corporations to benefit from global
supply chains like never before.44
While this phenomenon has led to benefits for the developing world
in terms of a closing knowledge and resource gap, 45 it has also given
multinational corporations unprecedented power relative to the
countries in which they operate. Because MNCs' resources tend to
dwarf those of their host countries, 46 they tend to behave in ways that
fall below standards of their domestic counterparts in dealing with the
communities where they do business. 47 This seemingly perpetual
asymmetry between multinational corporations and developing
countries has led to an increased risk of corporate abuses abroad. As a
result, the international community has worked hard to define the
contents of corporate social responsibility and compel corporate and
sovereign stakeholders to accept those contents both nominally and in
practice.

A. History of Corporate Social Responsibility
The notion that corporate action could be considered an
international criminal offense originated after the end of World War

43. See Joseph Stiglitz, RegulatingMultinational Corporations:Towards Principlesof
Cross-Border Legal Frameworks in a Globalized World Balancing Rights with
Responsibilities,23 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 451, 474 (2007).
44. See, e.g., Data, Data Everywhere, THE EcONOMIST, Feb. 25, 2010,
http://www.economist.com/node/15557443.
45. STIGLITZ, supra note 43, at 453.
46. See id. at 476 (noting that "[t]he annual revenues of General Motors are greater
than the GDP of more than 148 countries; while Wal-Mart's revenues exceed the
combined GDP of sub-Saharan Africa, excluding South Africa and Nigeria").
47. See id. at 476-79.
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At the Subsequent Nuremburg Trials held in 1945 and 1946 and
conducted by a United States military commission, corporate officers of
the I.G. Farbin trust, the Flick trust, and the Krupp firm were indicted
for crimes against humanity, war crimes, complicity in the crime of
mass murder, and aiding and abetting the inhumane acts performed by
the S.S.49 In the United Kingdom in 1946, a British Military Tribunal
convicted businessmen Karl Weinbacher and Bruno Tesch for aiding
and abetting murder for their manufacture of gas used in Nazi
concentration camps.5 0 There, what was once thought a politically and
legally neutral act, namely the manufacture and sale of a commodity,
became an act through which indirect criminal liability could run.5 1
Though the Nuremburg Trials were an important first step towards
internationally recognized and enforced rules on corporate social
responsibility, corporate actors continued to act with relative impunity
for the next half-century.52
Unlike international human rights more generally, new legal
norms dealing with corporations did not immediately begin to emerge
following the Nuremburg Trials.
Nonetheless, the idea that
corporations should consider stakeholders other than its shareholders
soon took hold. Less than a decade after the Nuremburg Trials,
economist Howard Bowen coined the term "corporate social
responsibility."5 3 According to Bowen, the notion of corporate social
responsibility was not antithetical to the shareholder primacy model
because he was convinced that economic benefits would flow from a
corporation's introduction of broader societal goals into its decision
making process. 54
Bowen's work, combined with a marked increase in international
trade, ultimately led to early efforts at corporate social responsibility in
the form international treaties and domestic legislation. These early
efforts were the result of developing countries' worries that their
national control would be diluted by the introduction of foreign direct
11.48

48. See Wolfgang Kaleck & Miriam Saage-Maa, Corporate Accountability for Human
Rights Violations Amounting to International Crimes: The Status Quo and Its Challenges,
8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 699, 701 (2010).
49. See TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, vols. 6 (Flick), 7-8 (I.G. Farben), 9 (Krupp).
Nuremberg (1951),
available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLawlNTs-warcriminals.html.
50. United Nations War Crimes Comm'n, The Zyklon B Case: Trial of Bruno Tesch
and Two Others, 1 L. REP. OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93, 93-102 (1947), available at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdflLaw-ReportsVol-1.pdf.
51. Id. at 102.
52. See Kaleck & Saage-Maa, supra note 48, at 702.
53. Kevin T. Jackson, Global Corporate Governance: Soft Law and Reputational
Accountability, 35 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 41, 48-49 (2010).
54. Id.
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investment but still saw such investment as the only means towards
economic progress.55 This early period is exemplified by the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development's (UNCTAD's)
Voluntary Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations, the first of
many voluntary codes of conduct, created in the early 1970's.56
Because these early efforts at CSR were not particularly effective in
shaping corporate behavior, the 1980's and 1990's were characterized
by "a self-regulating, profit-maximizing, shareholder-focused brand of
corporate governance."5 7 This period was fraught with ecological and
social calamities that eventually led to increased pressure for a more
binding brand of corporate social responsibility. Some well-known
examples of corporate malfeasance that took place during this period
include Unocal's criminal behavior in Myanmar, the Bhopal disaster in
India, the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and Nike's widespread use of
"sweatshops" in Asia. 58 These atrocities were handled in an ad hoc
59
fashion, with tactics ranging from public pressure in the case of Nike,
60
While
to federal liability in the Ninth Circuit in the case of Unocal.
norms
that
the debate as to precisely how to create and enforce CSR
for
such
the
need
meaningfully affect corporate behavior continues,
norms was painfully clear by the turn of the twenty-first century.

B. Character of Corporate Social Responsibility
1. Defining CorporateSocial Responsibility
Strictly speaking, no legally authoritative definition of corporate
social responsibility exists.6 1 However, a survey of several definitions
demonstrates a common understanding as to the general nature of the
concept. The United Nations Industrial Development Organization
defines CSR as "the way a company achieves balance or integration of
economic, environmental and social imperatives while at the same time
addressing shareholder expectations." 62 The Canadian government
notes that CSR applies to firms operating at home and abroad, and that
a key feature of CSR lies in the way a corporation engages with its
shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, governments, NGOs and

55. Id. at 49.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 50.
58. Id. at 51; Kaleck & Saage-Maa, supra note 48, at 702.
59. See Nike FAQs, GLOBAL EXCHANGE, http://www.globalexchange.org/sweatfree/
nike/faq (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).

60. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 2002).
61. MICHAEL KERR, RICHARD JANDA, & CHIP PITTS, CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 5 (Chip Pitts ed. 2009).
62. What is CSR?: Defining the Concept, UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
ORGANIZATION, http://www.unido.org/index.php?id=o72054 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
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IGOs. 63 The European Commission largely echoes the United Nation's
definition in its focus on social and environmental concerns but
explicitly describes CSR as a voluntary concept. 64 The Department of
Business, Innovation, and Skills of Great Britain adds a cost-benefit
analysis to the European Commission's definition when it describes
CSR as "voluntary actions that business can take, over and above
compliance with minimum legal requirements" with the aim of
"maximising [economic, social, and environmental] benefits and
minimizing the downsides." 65
Broadly speaking, corporate social
responsibility encompasses what John Elkington referred to as "the
In pursuing
triple bottom line" of "people, planet, and profit."66
corporate social responsibility, corporations should consider the social
and ecological impact of their business practices without ceasing to be a
profit-generating entity.

2. The UN's Ten Principlesof CSR
The most comprehensive and legally significant instrument
detailing the contents of CSR is the United Nations Global Compact's
Ten Principles of Corporate Social Responsibility.67 The Ten Principles
were officially launched on July 26, 2000 and have been endorsed by
over 8,000 entities, including 135 countries, 68 making the Ten
Principles the most widely acceded to voluntary CSR initiative in the
world.6 9 The Ten Principles are drawn from several multilateral
treaties including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Labor Organization's Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work, the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development,
and the United Nations
Convention Against
Corruption.70 Reference to these treaties not only bolsters the legal
63. Corporate Social Responsibility, INDUSTRY CANADA, http://www.ic.gc.caleic/site/
csr-rse.nsfleng/home (last visited Oct. 7, 2011).
64. Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper: Promoting a European
Framework for CorporateSocial Responsibility, 1, COM (2001) 366 final (July 18, 2001),
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com200l_0366en01.pdf.
65. DEP'T FOR Bus. INNOVATION & SKILLS, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 5

(2009), available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file50312.pdf.
66. JOHN ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS WITH FORKS: THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE OF 21ST
CENTURY BUSINESS, at iv (1998).

67. The Ten Principles, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobal
compact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html
(last visited, Oct. 7, 2011)
(hereinafter Ten Principles).
68. UN

Global

Compact

Participants, UNITED

NATIONS

GLOBAL

http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/index.html
Oct. 7, 2011).
69. Overview of the UN Global Compact, UNITED

COMPACT,

(last visited,

NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT,

http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited, Oct. 7, 2011).
70. Ten Principles, supra note 67; see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); LO Declaration on
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significance of the Ten Principles but also reminds states of their
already existing obligations to human rights, labor rights, the
environment, and non-corrupt business practices.
Where human rights are concerned, the United Nations Ten
Principles of Corporate Social Responsibility states that corporations
should support the protection of internationally recognized human
rights and ensure that they are not complicit in the violation of such
rights. 7 1 Regarding labor rights, the Ten Principles calls for business to
uphold the freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining,
eliminate all forms of compulsory, forced, and child labor, and eliminate
all forms of discrimination in employment. 72 With respect to the
environment, the Ten Principles state that businesses should take a
precautionary approach to the environment that seeks to promote
greater environmental responsibility and diffuse environmentally
friendly technologies.73 Finally, the Ten Principles clearly states that
corporations "should work against corruption in all its forms, including
extortion and bribery." 74
In sum, while the Ten Principles are nominally agreed upon, the
breadth of agreement may result from the fact that they are voluntary
and bind neither nation states nor corporations. In addition, the
widespread agreement fails to even address the question of how these
principles should be implemented. Indeed, where enforcement is
concerned, the debate surrounding CSR begins to appear similar to that
surrounding the lex mercatoria. There is such a wide spectrum of views
on the enforcement of CSR norms - ranging from a purely voluntary
approach to CSR to the establishment of corporate criminal liability in
the International Criminal Court - that a proponent of any position can
find ample support for that position in academic literature.7 5
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and Annex, June 18, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1233;
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero, Braz.,
June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), Annex I (June 14, 1992); United Nations Convention Against
Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4; U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4, (Oct. 31, 2003).
71. Ten Principles,supra note 67.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Eric Engle, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): Market-Based
Remedies for International Human Rights Violations?, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 103, 106
(2004) (exploring "(1) marketplace activism (influence over or via capital structure and
sales of the corporation), (2) internal self-regulation (codes of conduct), and (3)
shareholder activism"); Mordechai Kremnitzer, A Possible Case for Imposing Criminal
Liability on Corporationsin International Criminal Law, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 909, 910
(2010) (claiming "full justification to impose on corporations the rules of international law
applicable to natural persons, especially the most basic ones concerning genocide, crimes
against humanity and war crimes, and to regard them as accountable for respecting these
rules").
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The key distinction between the disagreement surrounding
corporate social responsibility and that surrounding the lex mercatoria
is that the former consists of complementary options while the latter
consists of mutually exclusive versions of the same story. The existence
of voluntary CSR norms does not impede other efforts to shape
corporate behavior, such as economic sanctions or civil liability. Each
method of ensuring corporate compliance with internationally
recognized social norms supplements the others. Conversely, the lex
mercatoria is either an historical phenomenon in which voluntary
norms were codified into binding law or is not. It is either in a state of
flux or is totally settled. Thus, when considering the debate around
methods for implementing CSR norms, one should view the debate as a
menu of options and not a choice between competing views on the same
subject.
C. Implementation of Corporate Social Responsibility
Norms

Each option advanced as a means toward implementing corporate
social responsibility norms seeks to balance practical efficacy with
political feasibility, and each approach inevitably favors one over the

other. The range of policy options can be divided into four categories:
international regulation, domestic regulation, civil liability, and
market-driven self-regulation.7 6 A brief description of each category is
warranted to provide the context in which market-driven norms of
corporate social responsibility exist and to illustrate the practical
difficulty in imposing binding norms of corporate social responsibility
upon corporations.

1. InternationalRegulation
As a means for creating binding CSR norms, international
regulation is the most ambitious and legally challenging option.
Proponents have therefore been unsuccessful in creating binding norms.
The most ambitious of all international corporate regulations is
international corporate criminal liability. 7 To establish such liability,
Article 5 of the Rome Statute would have to be amended to expand ICC
76. See generally Ralph G. Steinhardt, CorporateResponsibilityand the International
Law of Human Rights: The New Lex Mercatoria, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 177 (Philip Alston ed., 2005).
77. See, e.g., Kremnitzer, supra note 75, at 910; Joanna Kyriakakis, Corporationsand
the International Criminal Court: The Complementarity Objection Stripped Bare, 19
CRIM. L.F., 115, 150 (2008) ("Arguments in favour of the better regulation of
multinational corporations in their global activities, such as those outlined above, might
support a reform of the ICC to include corporations in its jurisdiction in furtherance of the
stated objectives of the Court, and so it is with such questions that the future reformers of
the ICC Statute should be concerned.").
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This
jurisdiction to include legal, as well as natural persons.78
approach has not been successful, not only because of a lack of political
will in developed countries to expose their corporations to such
liability,7 9 but also because international human rights law has
developed according to the notion of state primacy in which states bear
primary responsibility for the protection of the human rights of their
Furthermore, this approach is antithetical to the
citizens.8 0
shareholder primacy model of the corporation, which states that a
corporation's duty is to maximize shareholder profit.81 Shareholder
primacy is more than a dominant theoretical model for the corporation;
it is seen by some as legal requirement for boards of directors in the
United States of America. 82
As a result of these doctrinal challenges, most of the international
efforts consist of voluntary norms for corporations and multilateral
agreements directed at states, exemplified by the UN's Global Compact
discussed above. 83 While internationally developed sets of CSR norms
represent an important part of the discussion, as they are indeed one
option, in practice they create little opportunity for binding norms.
A third approach to international regulation of multinational
corporations comes in the form of multilateral treaties, which avoid the
complication of state primacy plaguing voluntary codes of corporate
conduct, as they are aimed directly at states. The four most prescient
treaties to CSR are those explicitly referenced by the Ten Principles:
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Labor
Organization's Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and the
United Nations Convention Against Corruption. 84 These treaties fail to
result in binding norms emanating from the host state for precisely the
same reason that corporate social responsibility is a problem in the first
place - namely that host governments lack the capacity to protect their

78. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5(1), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90, available at http://untreaty.un.org/codlicc/statute/romefra.htm.
79. See Jordan Sundell, Note, Ill-Gotten Gains: The Case for InternationalCorporate
Criminal Liability, 20 MINN. J. INT'L L. 648, 676 (2011) (describing significant political
challenges).
80. Steinhardt, supranote 4, at 933.

81. Id.
82. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) ("A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The
powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be
exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the
end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among
stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.").
83. Ten Principles,supra note 67.
84. See id.
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citizens from corporate abuses. Thus, where these multilateral treaties
are needed most, the relevant state parties do not enforce them.

2. Domestic CriminalRegulation
In addition to calls for international regulation of MNCs, developed
nations have used domestic mechanisms, including judicial action and
legislation, to affect the actions of corporations doing business abroad.
For example, a Dutch criminal court convicted businessman Frans van
Anraat of aiding and abetting war crimes for supplying the Iraqi
government with chemicals needed to manufacture mustard gas used
against the Kurdish population.85
More recently, the Hamburg
Consumer Protection Agency filed charges of unfair competition in
Heilbronn district court claiming that German discount retailer Lidl
falsely advertised its products by claiming that it provided fair labor
conditions to its workers in Bangladesh when an investigation
uncovered that the claim was far from true.86
Domestic regulation of multinational corporations has also taken
the form of legislation and executive orders, and some go so far as to
call for developed countries to apply its corporate laws to the local
parent companies of corporations operating overseas. 8 7 While this
approach has not gained political traction, domestic legislation has been
successful to a certain degree in regulating the actions of multinational
corporations. The most important and successful example of such
legislation is the United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which
makes it illegal for any corporation that is publicly traded in the United
States to bribe a foreign official. 88 This effort, initially seen as a
hindrance to American multinationals, has become a model global
standard. 89
85. Public Prosecutor v. Van Anraat, LJNAU8685, The Hague District Court, 23 Dec.
2005 at 13; BA6734, Gerechtshof s-Gravenhage, 2200050906-2, judgment of 5 Sept. 2007.
86. Consumer complaint demands fair working conditions, EUROPEAN CENTER FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL
AND
HUMAN
RIGHTS,
http://www.ecchr.de/index.php/lidl-case/
articles/consumer-complaint-demands-fair-working-conditions.html (last visited Oct. 12,
2011).
87. See, e.g., Jonathan Clough, Punishingthe Parent: CorporateCriminal Complicity
in Human Rights Abuses, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 899, 903 (2008).
88. Foreign CorruptPracticesAct of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 et seq (1998).
89. Angel Gurria, OECD Sec'y Gen., Towards Coherence in International Economic
Law: Perspectives at the 50th Anniversary of the OECD (Mar. 23, 2011), available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/44/0,3746,en_21571361_44315115_474720441_1_1_1 ,0.h
tml ('The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, which is based on the U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, has outlawed foreign bribery in 38 countries. OECD's recognized 'gold
standard' and strict monitoring mechanism puts key competitors closer in line with best
practices."); Letter from Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington to the U.S.
House of Representatives (Jan. 12, 2012), available at http://www.scribd.com
/doc/78161873/CREW-Foreign-Corrupt-Practices-Act-FCPA-Letter-to-Congress-01- 12-12
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The executive branch also has a role to play in ensuring compliance
with human rights norms abroad. This role takes the form of trade
sanctions, the most coercive method of ensuring compliance.90 These
trade sanctions commonly occur when a developed country, regional
organization, or inter-governmental organization learns of widespread
human rights violations occurring in a country and impose trade
sanctions upon that entire nation.91
These sanctions can be
implemented quickly and at little or no cost, 92 but they have also been
criticized for stifling a state's ability to pursue other human rights
objectives.93 In short, domestic regulation of multinational corporations
are highly effective where they have been forcefully implemented, but
such regulation is sparse and ad-hoc in nature, making them
unacceptable for proponents of universally binding norms.
3. Domestic Civil Regulation
The third category of enforcement mechanisms for corporate social
responsibility norms is a regime of civil liability. The Alien Tort Claims
Act ("ATCA") in the United States exemplifies this regime.9 4 The ACTA
was enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and vests original
jurisdiction in United States District Court allowing an alien to bring a
claim for the violation of the law of nations or a United States treaty. 95
In 1980, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that the ATCA could be invoked for human rights violations in Filartiga
96
u. Peiia-Irala.
There, the court held that a Paraguayan government
official violated the Act when he tortured a citizen of Paraguay.9 7 Then,
in 1997, the Northern District of California held that a corporation
could be brought to court under the ATCA when it found that Unocal
was complicit in human rights abuses perpetrated by Myanmar's

(describing the FCPA as having led to a "leadership role in curbing corruption both at
home and abroad").
90. See Olufemi Amao, Trade Sanctions, Human Rights and Multinational
Corporations:The EU-ACP Context, 32 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 379, 382 (2009).
91. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12532, 50 Fed. Reg. 36,861 (Sept. 9, 1985) (imposing
trade sanctions on South Africa in response to apartheid); Sudan Peace Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-245, 116 Stat. 1504 (2002) (imposing trade sanctions in Sudan in response to
violence perpetrated by the government).
92. Amao, supra note 90, at 394.
93. Id. at 386.
94. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
1350).

95. Id.
96. Filartigav. Peita-Irala,630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
97. Id.
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military on its behalf.9 8 The Ninth Circuit later affirmed the case,
opening the statute for use to enforce corporate social responsibility. 9
However, in the 2004 landmark case of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
the United States Supreme Court defined the jurisdiction of the ATCA
There, the Court held that the ATCA was
quite narrowly. 100
jurisdictional in nature but was meant to be immediately operable upon
passage. 101 Looking to the legislative history of the statute, the court
found that it was meant to create a common law cause of action for
piracy, violation of safe conducts, and infringement on the rights of
ambassadors. 102 It held that new causes of action could arise under the
common law if the norm that was allegedly violated was of sufficient
universality and specificity such that it mirrored the three eighteenth
century norms contemplated by Congress. 103
Though a United States Circuit court has held that the ATCA can
apply to corporations in the post-Sosa era, 104 the final disposition is
pending before the Supreme Court. Moreover, even if successful on the
merits, its reach appears to be limited to violations of international law
norms approaching, if not reaching, the status of jus cogens. Moreover,
even if the plaintiff is able to establish a violation of sufficient gravity to
be covered by the ATCA, he or she must properly serve the defendant
with process in the United States and overcome an almost certain
forum non-conveniens challenge - both significant obstacles in
themselves. 105 While there are alternatives to the ATCA, they all pose
significantly greater jurisdictional challenges than the American
statute, making the ATCA the strongest option for challenging
corporate human rights violations in civil court. 106 Because the civil
realm is limited only to the gravest violations of human rights and is
subject to significant jurisdictional challenges, it is not a practicable
option for enforcing corporate social responsibility on a global level.
4. Market-Based Regulation
The final class of CSR enforcement mechanisms comes from the
marketplace itself and is the direct focus of this paper. Examples of a
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 884 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 947 (9th Cir. 2002).
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 710 (2004).
Id. at 710, 725.
Id. at 724.
Id. at 725.
See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2006).

105. Bahareh Mostajelean, Note, Foreign Alternatives to the Alien Tort Claims Act:
The Success (or Is It Failure?)of Bringing Civil Suits Against Multinational Corporations
That Commit Human Rights Violations, 40 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 497, 502-03 (2008).
106. See id. at 505-14 (including the Brussels Convention, the United Kingdom's
common law judicial system, and France's Civil Code as potential legal sources that could
be used to bring a MNC to court for violations of human rights).
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market-driven approach to corporate social responsibility include
rights- sensitive branding, unilateral codes of conduct, voluntary
submission to auditing, and shareholder pressure. 107 Although this
category of norms has the strongest practical foundation, the reach of
these efforts is fairly narrow and actual compliance with the underlying
norms is mixed, even when the efforts are successfully implemented.
The basis of the advocacy for a market-based regime of CSR norms
is an apparent absence of alternatives that do not offend international
human rights law, corporate law, or both. 0 8 Externally imposed CSR
norms offend the traditional notion of shareholder primacy "by
requiring management to develop an expertise in human rights law and
exercise de facto control over abuses generally committed by
governments, raising costs without raising revenues."10 9 These topdown norms similarly offend the notion of state primacy in human
rights law, the idea that states have the primary responsibility to
protect human rights, absent extraordinary circumstances defined by
national agreement. 110 These points are relatively straightforward but
nonetheless bear repeating. The fundamental nature of shareholder
primacy and state primacy in corporate and international human rights
law, respectively, cannot be overstated. A market-driven approach
accordingly seeks to avoid the problem arising from shareholder
primacy altogether and make the state primacy model largely
irrelevant. At present, it is the most practical and realistic of all
approaches.
4a. Rights-Sensitive Branding
The first subset of market-driven CSR norms is rights-sensitive
branding, which seeks to attract "a profitable contingent of consumers
[who are willing to] pay a premium for some assurance that the goods
they purchase are not produced or marketed in violation of the rights of
Some prominent examples of rightsworkers and communities."'
sensitive branding include Starbucks' "fair trade" coffee, Chiquita's
"ethical banana" (marketed in Europe), and the well known "Kimberly
Process" aimed at reducing the prevalence of conflict diamonds on the
world market.112 While these efforts prove that some consumers are
willing to pay higher retail prices for goods they believe to be
manufactured and marketed in a way that is consistent with these

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Steinhardt, supra note 76, at 180-85.
See Steinhardt, supra note 4, at 933-34.
Id. at 933.
Id. at 933-34.
Steinhardt, supra note 76, at 181.
Id. at 181-82.
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4b. Unilateral Codes of Conduct
In a similar vein, corporations seeking to show their customers that
they hold themselves to high standards when it comes to human rights,
labor rights, and environmental protection may adopt unilateral codes
of conduct. Firms as diverse as Royal Dutch Shell, Nike, and Liz
Claiborne have adopted these unilateral codes of conduct.1 14 Critics of
these codes argue that they are little more than public relations
strategies or attempts to preempt host countries from issuing tougher
regulation. 115 However, empirical studies show these unilateral codes
have led to real change, especially when coupled with external
monitoring mechanisms.e1 6 Unilateral codes of conduct are especially
effective when they are implemented by a company high on the supply
chain that extends the code to suppliers as a condition of doing
business.1 1 7 However, there is no way to enforce these codes of conduct,
and frequently, it is impossible to know if the corporations advancing
these codes are even attempting to comply with them.
4c. Social Accountability Auditing & Certification
The third subcategory of market-driven CSR norms is social
accountability auditing and certification, which occurs when a
corporation partners with an NGO to develop verifiable standards in
the workplace and submits itself to periodic auditing to ensure that the
corporation in fact meets those standards."s This approach seeks to
remedy some of the deficiencies in ensuring compliance associated with
declaratory unilateral codes of conduct. The SA 8000, developed by
Social Accountability International and seeking compliance with
standards in child labor, forced labor, health and safety, freedom of
association, freedom from discrimination, disciplinary practices, work
hours, compensation, and management systems, serves as a prime

113. Id. at 182.
114. Id. at 183.
115. Gunther Teubner, Self-ConstitutionalizingTNCs? On the Linkage of 'Private"and
"Public"CorporateCodes of Conduct, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 617, 619 (2011).
116. See, e.g., Richard Locke et al., Does Monitoring Improve Labor Standards?
Lessons from Nike 19, 37-38 (Corporate Soc. Responsibility Initiative, John F. Kennedy
Sch. of Gov't, Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. 24, 2006); Anne Landman, Absolving
Your Sins and CYA CorporationsEmbrace Voluntary Codes of Conduct, PR WATCH (Sept.
4, 2001), http://www.prwatch.org/node/7724.
117. See Larry Cata Backer, Multinational Corporations as Objects and Sources of
TransnationalRegulation, 14 ILSA J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 499, 509-10 (2008) (using Gap, Inc.
as an example).
118. Steinhardt, supra note 76, at 184.
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example. 119
Participants in this system voluntarily submit to
announced
and unannounced
surveillance audits to ensure
compliance. 120 Other examples include the ISO 14001 and the ISO
9000, which seek compliance with environmental standards and quality
control norms, respectively.12 1 However, these accountability audits are
only as good as the auditors themselves. The Enron debacle, in which
Arthur Andersen, Enron's accountant, actively worked to conceal fraud
and destroy evidence, is a striking example of the limitations on relying
upon accounting measures to ensure compliance.1 22
The Arthur
Andersen scandal shows the degree to which corporations can
manipulate their records to dictate the outcome of an audit.
4d. Ethical Investment by Shareholders
The final category of market-based mechanisms to promote
compliance with corporate social responsibility norms is ethical
investment organizations through which interested shareholders and
institutional investors apply shareholder pressure to coerce
corporations into heeding social norms.123 This form of market-based
pressure is the purest of all four, as it falls directly in line with the
shareholder primacy model of the corporation.
In this instance,
corporations pursue CSR norms not because they feel a duty to third
party stakeholders, but because their own shareholders have demanded
it. The most famous example of such shareholder pressure is the
Norwegian Government Pension Fund. 124 The second largest pension
fund with assets in excess of $300 billion,125 the Norwegian Fund has
used its formidable economic sway to disinvest from Singapore
Technologies because of the "large degree of probability" that it was
producing anti-personnel mines through a subsidiary, 126 and to exclude
Kerr-McGee from its portfolio for actions taken off the coast of the nonSimilarly, certain
self-governing territory of Western Sahara. 127
investment vehicles like the FTSE4GGOOD Index series have been
created to measure the performance of companies that meet globally
recognized CSR norms so that "consultants, asset owners, fund
119. See Soc. ACCOUNTABILITY INT'L, SOcIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 8000, at 5-8 (2008),
available at http://www.sa-intl.org/_dataln_0001/resources/live/2008StdEnglishFinal.pdf.
120. Id. at 10.
121. Steinhardt, supra note 76, at 184.
122. See Gary J. Aguirre, The Enron Decision: Closing the Fraud-FreeZone on Errant
Gatekeepers?, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 447, 447 (2003).
123. Steinhardt, supra note 76, at 184-85.
124. See Simon Chesterman, The Turn to Ethics: Disinvestment from Multinational
Corporations for Human Rights Violations-The Case of Norway's Sovereign Wealth
Fund, 23 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 577, 582 (2008).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 584.
127. Id. at 591.
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managers, investment banks, stock exchanges and brokers [can assess]
or creat[e] responsible investment products."128 In the end, however,
"[t]hese indices are necessarily partial, because they include only 'high
impact' and only particular areas of corporate responsibility, some of
which have little to do with human rights."1 29
Because these market-driven approaches to binding corporate
social responsibility norms are enforced by the marketplace and not by
governments, they have been met with considerably more practical
success than their more coercive counterparts. This has led some to
argue that the best hope for binding CSR norms comes not from
governments but from corporations themselves.
5. The Argument That Market-Driven Norms Are a New Lex
Mercatoria
The strongest proponents of a market-driven approach to corporate
social responsibility argue that CSR can and should be seen as a new
30 The argument, advanced most notably by Professor
lex mercatoria.1
Ralph G. Steinhardt, is that the true character of the lex mercatoria is
highly representative of the aspirations that proponents of enforceable
corporate social responsibility norms have for the future of the
concept.131 According to Professor Steinhardt, the lex mercatoria
"blurred the distinction between self-interest and altruism," was
transnational in scope, grounded in good faith, reflective of market
practices, and ultimately codified into binding legal norms.132
Steinhardt argues that corporate social responsibility and the lex
mercatoria share the same "genetic marker" implying that corporate
social responsibility will evolve in much the same way as the lex
mercatoria.133 Thus, Steinhardt predicts that the seemingly soft
notions of corporate social responsibility will evolve into hard legal
norms because a merchant's self-interest will depend on his respect for
the interests of others. Thus, at the core of this private law ultimately
rests public values. 134
Professor Steinhardt is right in arguing that corporations have in
fact submitted voluntarily to CSR norms without the help of
governments and that "the justifications for this 'human rights
128. FTSE4GOOD
Index
Series,
FTSE:
THE
INDEX
COMPANY,
(last visited, Oct. 17,
http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4Good-IndexSeries/index.jsp
2011).
129. Steinhardt, supra note 76, at 185 n.14.
130. See, e.g., Steinhardt, supra note 4, at 947-48; Pitts, supra note 4, at 357; Engle,
supra note 4, at 118.
131. See Steinhardt, supra note 76, at 223; Steinhardt, supra note 4, at 950.
132. Steinhardt, supra note 76, at 223-24.
133. Id. at 225.
134. Id.
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entrepreneurialism' are multiple and mutually reinforcing." 13 5
However, this author argues that rather than developing as a result of
an emerging understanding among merchants that respect for CSR
norms is essential to collective mercantile success, binding norms of
corporate social responsibility will result from pressures entirely
outside the corporate suite and will ultimately come in the form of
clauses in bilateral investment treaties. A close examination of existing
CSR norms shows that rather than blurring self-interest and altruism
in a way that derogates from the shareholder primacy model, every
current example of market-driven CSR can be easily explained by
simple self-interest on the part of the corporation.
IV. MARKET-DRIVEN CSR: SELF INTEREST IS A PRECONDITION FOR
ALTRUISM

Proponents of corporate social responsibility as a new lex
mercatoriaoffer the notion that the lex mercatoria "effectively blurred
the distinction between self-interest and altruism" in support of their
position. 136 The idea behind this argument is that merchants have
historically been willing to bind themselves to lex mercatoria norms
that favored the general interest, and they can accordingly be expected
to bind themselves in a similar fashion to corporate social responsibility
norms in the future.
Professor Steinhardt himself admits that, while the benefits of lex
mercatoria norms flowed primarily to the mercantile community itself,
the benefits of corporate social responsibility norms flow to a "labour
force or a society or even an idea."137 Yet Professor Steinhardt and
other proponents maintain that lex mercatoria and CSR norms are
sufficiently similar such that CSR norms will develop into a new lex
mercatoria. A closer look into the types of corporations and situations
that have given rise to voluntary CSR norms suggests that the
shareholder primacy model is alive and well and that short-term
corporate self-interest is the most natural explanation for the
development of market-driven CSR norms.
Current examples of market-driven CSR further suggest that such
norms are not likely to develop outside of three specific, and relatively
rare, scenarios. These scenarios include servicing the "right" customer
base, atoning for a prior CSR atrocity, or servicing the "right" customer
base after a CSR atrocity.

135. Steinhardt, supra note 4, at 937.
136. Steinhardt, supra note 76, at 223.
137. Id. at 225.
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A. Servicing the "Right" Customer Base
The first scenario involves corporations that are dealing in branded
goods and servicing a customer base that is not price sensitive and
highly values-sensitive. The second scenario consists of companies
dealing in low-cost goods or commodities that are atoning for an
egregious and widely publicized CSR-related disaster within the
industry. The third scenario is actually a combination of the first two
and occurs when a significant and widely publicized CSR disaster
occurs in an industry that services non-price sensitive, highly valuessensitive customers. Though this third class is quite small, it is there
where the most meaningful CSR norms have developed. Because these
three scenarios are more easily explained by the shareholder primacy
model than by a sudden shift towards altruism, the empirical claim that
MNC's have in fact increased compliance with CSR norms does little in
the way of advancing the notion that CSR norms are capable of fully
developing into binding law, from the bottom up, along the supposed
line of the lex mercatoria.
The first scenario results in voluntary codes of conduct and rights
sensitive branding lines coming from companies like Starbucks,138
Jonathan's Organics,139 Avon Cosmetics, 140 Ben & Jerry's,14 1 and Whole
Foods Market. 142 The first thing to note about these examples is that
they are all premium brands. If one were to line up all of a grocery
store's coffee, produce, and ice cream by price per ounce, Starbucks,
Jonathan's Organics, and Ben & Jerry's products would all be at or near
the expensive end of the line. Customers buying high-end goods such as
these are willing to pay a premium for their product. Thus, the
economic effects of adhering to CSR norms are passed from the firm to
the consumer where they are happily accepted. Moreover, these highend goods providers are competing with other high-end goods providers.
Ben & Jerry's competes with Hiagen-Dazs; Starbucks competes with
Seattle's Best. Because a significant segment of the affluent consumer
group values social responsibility above price,1 4 3 companies selling
high-end, branded goods are able to gain market share through their
adoption and promotion of their adoption of CSR codes.
138. See Products: Coffee, FAIR TRADE USA, http://fairtradeusa.org/productspartners/coffee (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
TRADE
USA,
Fruits
&
Vegetables,
FAIR
139. See
Products:
http://fairtradeusa.org/products-partners/fruits-vegetables (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
140. See Products: Body Care, FAIR TRADE USA, http://fairtradeusa.org/productspartners/body-care (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
141. See Products: Cocoa, FAIR TRADE USA, http://fairtradeusa.org/productspartners/cocoa (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
142. See Products: Wine, FAIR TRADE USA, http://fairtradeusa.org/productspartners/wine (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
143. See Steinhardt, supra note 76, at 181.
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The implementation of market-based CSR norms under this first
scenario does indeed have positive consequences for those outside of the
firm, but to call the adoption of these norms "altruistic" goes too far. A
company develops a rights-sensitive branding line for a high-end
product in order to gain share of a market whose consumers are already
willing to accept a higher price; it is a wholly self-interested decision.
B. Atoning For a Prior Atrocity
The second scenario under which corporations aggressively adopt
CSR norms, namely corporations in an industry marred by egregious
and well-publicized human rights or environmental disasters, is equally
self-interested. The most significant examples of this phenomenon can
be seen in Shell Nigeria, 144 Exxon Mobil,14 5 and Union Carbide, who
were responsible for the atrocities committed against the Ogoni people,
the Exxon-Valdez oil spill, and the Bhopal disaster, respectively.
Whereas the first class of corporate actors undertake CSR
initiatives to attract new customers by going above and beyond the
industry standard when it comes to corporate social responsibility, this
second class seeks to retain existing customers by proving that the
current industry standard is acceptable to the broader public when it
comes to CSR. The firms in this second class are primarily seeking to
restore their reputational accountability so that they can continue to be
competitive. 146 The measures taken under the second scenario are even
less altruistic than those taken under the first, as the corporation sees
them as being necessary for survival rather than a marketing strategy
designed to gain market share. Moreover, the actions taken by this
class more commonly take the form of charity and community support,
rather than norms designed to regulate business practices. 147
C. Atoning For a Prior Atrocity in the Minds of the "Right"
Consumer
Finally, there are certain scenarios where human rights atrocities
surface in an industry supplying goods to affluent consumers who are
more concerned with the assurance that their values are reflected in the
products they consume than about the price they must pay for the goods
themselves. The two key examples of this third scenario involve the

144. See Environment and Society, SHELL NIGERIA, http://www.shell.com.ng/homel
contentIngalenvironment society/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
145. See Safety & Environment, EXXON MOBIL, http://www.exxonmobil.com
/Corporate/safety.aspx(last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
146. Jackson, supra note 53, at 91 (noting that this system of reputational
accountability is only effective when coupled with a system of civil liability).
147. See, e.g., SHELL NIGERIA, supra note 144 (focusing on education and healthcare in
the region).
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diamond industry and the textiles industry and have resulted in some
of the most robust examples of enforceable CSR norms to date.
The Kimberly Process was created in response to news in the 1990's
that a large number of diamonds bought in the developing world were
being used to fund conflicts in African nations such as Sierra Leone,
Liberia, and Angola. 148 The egregious nature of the African conflicts led
the United Nations to announce the launch of the Kimberly Process in
2002.149 The Kimberly Process, which went into effect on January 1,
2003, requires that each participating country track each exported
diamond back to the mine from which it came or to the source of import
by implementing national laws that ensure compliance, designate
import and export authorities, establish control systems, provide
certificates for each diamond, ensure that diamonds are shipped in
tamper-resistant containers, and collect relevant data on their
activities. 150 The Process has been highly successful in reducing the
prevalence of conflict diamonds to less than 1 percent of the global
market.15 1 Similarly, the apparel industry has responded to harsh
criticism regarding labor conditions at suppliers' factories by developing
robust CSR schemes. For example, Nike employs a team of around 100
inspectors who grade suppliers on labor standards and work with
managers to address issues as they arise.152 Similar programs have
been implemented by Gap, Inc.153 (the parent company of Gap, Old
Navy, and Banana Republic Clothing lines), as well as Levi Strauss,
Co. 15 4 Like the Kimberly Process, these initiatives have been quite
successful in shaping corporate behavior.
A proponent of CSR as a new lex mercatoria might argue that the
Kimberly Process and the changes in the garment manufacturing
industry are particularly salient examples of corporate altruism. In
actuality these examples merely point out that the two alreadymentioned forces of CSR - a non-price sensitive, highly values-sensitive
consumer base and the presence of a well-publicized CSR atrocity - are
more potent together than they are alone. Purchasers of diamonds and
branded clothing generally have a high level of disposable income and
148. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-978, CONFLICT DIAMONDS: AGENCY
ACTIONS NEEDED TO ENHANCE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CLEAN DIAMOND TRADE ACT 1-2
(2006) [hereinafter GAO Report].
149. Tina Muscarella Gooch, Conflict Diamonds or Illicit Diamonds: Should the
Difference Matter to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme?, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J.
189, 193 (2008).
150. GAO Report, supra note 148, at 9.
Dec. 7, 2006,
151. Vivienne Walt, Diamonds Aren't Forever, FORTUNE,
http://money.cnn.comrJmagazines/fortune/fortune-archive/2006/12/11/8395442/index.htm.
152. Nike's New Game Plan for Sweatshops, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 20,
2004), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_38/b3900011_mzOO1.htm.
153. Backer, supra note 117, at 511.
154. Steinhardt, supranote 76, at 183.
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are likely to be aware of, and bothered by, the idea that their purchases
are fueling bloody African conflicts or unconscionable labor conditions.
Diamond and branded textile producers are under constant pressure
outside the corporate suite to improve their practices as a result of
reports of conflict diamonds and sweatshops.
The directors and
managers inside the corporation know that their consumers are more
likely to walk away from their product as a result of these corporate
abuses than for having to pay a marginal premium to ensure that such
abuses do not occur.
None of this is to say that the above-mentioned efforts are negative,
or even unimpressive. Much of the beauty of the free market capitalist
system can be found in these "win-win" situations, and such scenarios
should be sought after and implemented at every turn. But altruism is
defined as the "disinterested and selfless concern for the well-being of
others,"155 and accordingly, current examples of market-driven
corporate social responsibility fail to fit the definition. They are all
driven primarily by corporate self-interest and can be explained using
the shareholder primacy model of the corporation.
One cannot look at an action from the outside and decide if it is
self-interested or altruistic. Not all actions with a positive social effect
are altruistic, just as not all actions with a negative social impact are in
the corporation's self-interest. To decide whether a corporation's
decision is altruistic or self-interested, one must look into the
circumstances surrounding the decision and characterize the decision
with reference to those circumstances.
Here, the requisite
circumstances appear to be a corporation looking to gain market share
in a segment actively seeking CSR, the presence of a widely reported
disaster within a given industry, or both. As such, self-interest appears
to be a precondition for altruism in the corporate context. These three
scenarios will never make up more than a small corner of all global
business, ensuring that adherence to CSR norms such that those norms
are effectively binding will remain primarily the responsibility of those
outside the corporation.
V. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IS NOT A NEw LEXMERCATORIA
Even apart from the fact that all current examples of marketdriven CSR are more easily explained through the shareholder primacy
model of the corporation than by a novel introduction of altruism into
that model, there are two important conceptual flaws to the argument
that corporate social responsibility shares a common fate with the lex
mercatoria. The first is that the entire argument rests upon a premise
that is far from certain - namely that lex mercatoria norms developed
155. Definition of Altruism, in OXFORD
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/altruism.

ENGLISH
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exactly in the way that the traditional narrative suggests - an assertion
upon which considerable doubt has been cast. Also, lex mercatoriaand
corporate social responsibility norms have the opposite practical effect
on firms with respect to effect on the price of goods sold, ease of
business administration, and changes in exposure to liability. These
flaws suggest that what Professor Steinhardt referred to as a shared
genetic marker is much more superficial, and that corporate social
responsibility norms are not likely to develop in the same fashion as the
supposedly ancient and independently-binding norms of the lex
mercatoria.

A. A Narrow View of History
Upon surveying the historical landscape of the lex mercatoria,156
two basic historical characterizations emerge. The first is that the lex
mercatoria began as a set of medieval mercantile customs, but at a
certain point in the sixteenth century, courts began to recognize these
customs as binding - even if applying the common law directly would
lead a different result.157 The second is that what is called the lex
mercatoria actually refers to an extrajudicial practice through which
educated men, each of whom saw the other as a relative equal, settled
disputes. Mercantile customs were local facts to be proved as such,158
and when the law, as applied to the particular facts of a case, led to a
particular result, governmentally sanctioned courts reached that result.
The difference between these two arguments is one of causation.
Under the first argument - the traditional view of the lex mercatoriathe existence of reliable, equitable, and workable mercantile custom
actually caused that custom to be codified into law. Judges actively and
explicitly incorporated mercantile custom into the common law and
applied it as such to the parties before it. Under the second, alternative
view of the lex mercatoria,this causal relationship does not exist. The
lex mercatoria is more properly considered an alternative dispute
resolution mechanism, or even a means of extrajudicial settlement,
than an independent body of law. If the so-called lex mercatoria is
merely an example of an extrajudicial settlement mechanism or a court
applying facts to law, it is wholly irrelevant to the modern issue of
corporate social responsibility. 15 9 The argument that CSR should be

156. See supra Part II.B.
157. Baker, supranote 25, at 297.
158. Id. at 321.
159. This article is not about which historical characterization is correct; the argument
that CSR norms should be seen as a new lex mercatoria fails on independent economic
and financial grounds. It is worth noting, however, that the alternative history of the lex
mercatoria is on stronger logical footing that the traditional view. The strongest
argument in favor of the traditional view appears to be that mercantile laws were found
to be so similar in so many jurisdictions for such a long time. This is indeed a remarkable
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seen as a new lex mercatoria only makes sense if the traditional
historical view of the lex mercatoriais ontologically accurate.
Thus, the argument that corporate social responsibility is properly
viewed as a new lex mercatoria is built upon an unsound foundation.
But even if one is willing to concede the historical portion, the overall
argument still crumbles.
The desired norms of corporate social
responsibility and the identified norms of the lex mercatoria are
foundationally different, such that while the latter were economically
destine not only to emerge, but to bind the stakeholders, the former will
almost certainly require substantial outside pressure before they
become binding.

B. Polar Opposite Business Effects
Lex mercatoria norms benefitted merchants by reducing liability
and lowering overhead costs, which in turn allowed them to lower prices
and satisfy consumers.
On the other hand, CSR norms expose
corporations to a new form of liability and raise overhead costs, which
lead to an increase in aggregate prices, making all but the most well-off
and socially conscious consumers unhappy.
If one accepts that
corporations are primarily profit-maximizing, liability-minimizing
entities (which, as Section IV, infra suggests, is the case), it is easy to
see how lex mercatoria norms developed without any governmental
pressure. It is also easy to see why CSR norms are not likely to develop
in the same way.
1. Lex MercatoriaNorms Reduce Liability
The two primary characteristics of lex mercatoria norms are "good
faith and dispatch."160 This focus on equity and expeditiousness served
in no small part to make the merchant's business easier to run from a
purely practical standpoint, which ultimately reduced the cost of goods
sold. Several examples of identified lex mercatoria norms prove this
point.

One such example is the lex mercatorianorm that stated that each
partner in a partnership was an agent for the partnership and could
thus bind the partnership even when acting alone. 16 1 This allowed each
partner to conduct business on behalf of the partnership without the
other's presence. Partners could cover twice the area in the same
fact, but this author believes that such universality is most simply explained not by courts
adopting custom as independently-binding law for the first and only time, but by: 1)
Medieval merchants of different nations met with each other at trade fairs as a matter of
historical fact; and 2) economic efficiency is equally apparent to educated people of reason,
regardless of nationality, and the merchant was among the most well off class of medieval
and ancient society.
160. BEWES, supra note 7, at 19.

161. Id. at 20.
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amount of time rather than duplicating all of their efforts due to a legal
requirement that both partners accede to every transaction undertaken
by the partnership.
Similarly, the lex mercatoriasaid that an employee of the merchant
was but a "piece of machinery causing legal relations between his
principle and the third person," having "no independent rights or
liabilities of his own."1 62 This lex mercatorianorm performed a similar
function to the preceding norm, except that it allowed for an employee
to do business on behalf of the merchant rather than allowing a single
partner to do business on behalf of the entire partnership. Thus, where
the Roman law imposed an economically inefficient burden on
merchants, lex mercatoria norms were created and mutually agreed
upon in order to bypass that legal burden, lower overhead costs, lower
the cost of goods sold, and increase profits.

2. CSR Norms Increase Liability
Conversely, violations of corporate social responsibility norms
almost always arise out of perceived impediments to easy business
administration. Sadly, these impediments underlie every instance of
egregious CSR abuses. Royal Dutch Shell's actions in Nigeria illustrate
the problem, though unfortunately there is no shortage of historical
examples.

Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Wiwa v. Anderson, and Wiwa v.
Shell Petroleum Development Company are three lawsuits brought
against the Dutch oil company for complicity in the summary execution,
crimes against humanity, torture, inhumane treatment, arbitrary
arrest, wrongful death, assault and battery, and infliction of emotional
distress performed by the Nigerian government against the Ogoni
people. 163 Royal Dutch Shell began drilling for oil in the Ogoni area of
Nigeria in 1958.164 This drilling led to the severe contamination of the
water and agricultural land relied upon by the region for survival. 6 5
For many years, the Ogoni people staged protests against Shell's
activities in the region, which the Nigerian government repeatedly
quashed through violent means. 166 The violence perpetrated by the
Nigerian government for Royal Dutch Shell's benefit culminated in
1995 when "the company and its subsidiary colluded with the Nigerian
government to bring about the arrest and execution of the Ogoni 9,"
who were hanged after a military trial premised upon obviously
162. Id. at 21.
163. Wiwa et al. v. Royal Dutch Petroleum et al., CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,
(last visited
http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/wiwa-v.-royal-dutch-petroleum
Oct. 20, 2011).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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trumped up charges. 167 Royal Dutch Shell was brought before a United
States District Court for violations of the ATCA and settled their case
for $15.5 million.168
It is difficult to argue that Royal Dutch Shell would have saved
money had they acceded to the demands of the Ogoni people. For some
perspective, in 1997, Royal Dutch Shell was exporting 899,000 barrels
of oil per day out of Nigeria. 169 Using 1997's average oil price of $18.97
per barrel,170 Royal Dutch Shell exported $6,224,720,950 worth of oil
from Nigeria in 1997, or $17,054,030 per day. Thus, the $15,500,000
settlement paid to the Ogoni, when converted into 1997 dollars, 171
amounts to 68 percent of one day's worth of Nigerian oil production. To
satisfy the concerns of the Ogoni people in Nigeria, Royal Dutch Shell
would have had to either reduce the pace of extraction such that
environmental degradation was eliminated, or, if that was not feasible,
stop production altogether. Either way, meeting CSR standards in this
particular case would have entailed an increase in overhead cost
coupled with a decrease in volume, thereby narrowing profit margins by
much more than the ultimate cost of settlement.
3. Following Lex MercatoriaNorms Leads to Lower Prices
Inexorably connected to lex mercatoria'sand CSR's effect on cost of
goods sold is their effect of the ultimate price of goods sold. Specific lex
mercatoria norms, such as those allowing a single partner to bind the
partnership and an employee to act solely as an agent of the merchant,
not only reduce overhead cost but also allowed efficiencies to be passed
on to customers in the form of lower prices in order to increase market
share. Similarly, the expedited process favored by the lex mercatoria,
used in medieval commercial courts, and, according to the traditional
narrative, adopted by traditional courts, served to minimize the costs of
disputes. To be clear; merchants could choose to utilize these savings to
pad their profits rather than lower their prices, but the aggregate effect
of competition suggests that, when all firms in an industry are able to
enjoy the same set of savings, they will compete with each other on
price over the long term.

4. Following CSR Norms Leads to Higher Prices
Contrast the economic results of adherence to lex mercatorianorms
with that of modern adhering to modern CSR norms, which is
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. INT'L Bus. PUBL'NS, USA, DOING BUSINESS AND INVESTING IN NIGERIA GUIDE:
VOLUME 1 STRATEGIC AND PRACTICAL INFORMATION 113 (2011).

170. History

of

Illinois

Basin

Posted

Crude

Oil

Prices,

http://www.ioga.com/Special/crudeoilHist.htm (last visited, Oct. 20, 2011).
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ultimately to raise prices. When a company changes its business
practices to respect more fully the human rights of the population, the
labor rights of workers, and the environment, it must inevitably spend
money to make these changes. Corporations can either take these
additional costs out of their profits or they can pass them onto
consumers.
Absent market pressure to take the former course,
corporations, as profit-maximizing entities, are likely to do the latter.
Some have argued that respecting labor rights will ultimately result in
increased productivity and that respecting human rights and the
environment will lead to a stable market. 172 While true, these savings
can only begin to be realized after the corporate culture has changed
and employees and the host country's society at large respond to that
change. Most companies take a shorter view and see CSR norms as
drivers of increased costs.
5. Lex MercatoriaNorms Limit Potential Liability
The final foundational difference between lex mercatorianorms and
CSR norms is that the former reduces liability while the latter
increases liability. The limited partnership is supposedly a creation of
The limited
the lex mercatoria and illustrates this difference.
partnership, in which a general partner is fully exposed to personal
liability while the limited partner is exposed to liability only up to his
investment, was created to avoid the prohibition on usury while
simultaneously allowing the limited partner to control, and thereby
reduce, his exposure to liability.1 73 Similarly, the lex mercatoria norm
allowing for interest to be charged under the head of damages on an
unpaid account, 174 as well as the norm stating that an unpaid vendor
has a lien on the goods sold against the original buyer, even if that good
has been passed to a subpurchaser,175 serve primarily to ensure that
liability for the good sold remained with the purchaser and not the
seller. Together, they represent a reduction in liability from the
perspective of the merchant.
6. CSR Norms Expose Corporationsto New Forms of Liability
CSR norms lead to the opposite result of increased liability because
ascension to CSR norms represents a corporation's de facto acceptance
of new forms of liability. Where before corporations were able to act
with impunity when taking environmental and humanitarian shortcuts,
172. See, e.g., Denis G. Arnold & Laura P. Hartman, Beyond Sweatshops: Positive
Deviancy and Global Labor Practices, 14 Bus. ETHICS 206, 222 (2005); ASIAN DEV BANK,
CORE LABOR STANDARDS 11 (2006), available at http//ap-irnet.ilobkk.or.thlresources/corelabor-standards-handbook-1/.
173. BEWES, supra note 7, at 77.

174. Id. at 23.
175. Id. at 20.
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acceptance of binding CSR norms constitutes acceptance on the part of
the corporation that of a requirement to take on liability for a class of
wrongs that were not previously likely to result in such liability. Given
that the primary function of a corporation is to shield the individuals
running the corporation from liability, it comes as no surprise that
corporations were quick to adopt liability-minimizing lex mercatoria
norms and have resisted the imposition of liability-increasing CSR
norms.
Simply put, corporations are creatures seeking to minimize liability
and maximize profitability. Even outside the question of whether
efforts to minimize liability and maximize profit are the only efforts
that a corporation should seek to undertake, it is undeniable that
maximizing profits and minimizing liabilities is the corporation's
natural predisposition. These fundamental differences explain why lex
mercatorianorms developed from within the mercantile community and
why binding CSR norms will only come as the result of outside
pressure. Because of these foundational differences with respect to cost
of goods sold, price, and exposure to liability universally binding CSR
norms will only result from outside pressure, making them nothing like
the lex mercatoria.
VI. LESSONS TO DRAW FROM THE CONTRAST BETWEEN CSR AND THE LEX

MERCATORIA
The argument advanced above is not necessarily a defeatist one,
and resigning oneself to the position that corporations are profitmaximizing entities does not automatically suggest that they are
incapable of benefitting non-shareholders. Quite to the contrary, the
vast majority of the daily actions of world's corporations do not even
touch on issues of corporate social responsibility, and every example of
enforced adherence to voluntary CSR norms shows that companies are
more than willing to behave responsibly when they see such behavior as
being in their self-interest.
Nonetheless, because multinational corporations operating in
developing countries, especially those providing discount goods and
serving commodity markets, are prone to corporate abuses, the need
remains for binding CSR norms. Ongoing efforts, both public and
private, have certainly shrunk the universe of corporate abusers, but
they have not eliminated it altogether. While Professor Steinhardt is
entirely correct in noting that the source of binding CSR norms does not
lie in international human rights law or corporate law, he is wrong to
argue that it lies in the corporations themselves. Instead, binding CSR
norms are most likely to take the form of clauses in bilateral
investment treaties (BITs) or in the practice of law enforcement and
regulatory bodies in host countries. These changes will likely result
from macroeconomic and political developments giving host countries
increased bargaining power relative to multinational corporations.
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They will not emerge out of new customary legal norms emanating from
multinational corporations.
Currently, bilateral investment treaties are drafted in favor of
developed countries.17 6
This is because developing nations see
themselves in competition with each other to attract foreign
investment. As a result, developing nations tend to sacrifice their own
interests in improved labor standards or environmental quality in the
hopes that they will attract enough additional investment to make up
for those sacrifices. 177 This has led to a race to the bottom, leaving all
developing countries worse off and creating the assumption that host
governments are not likely to play a positive role in the realm of
corporate social responsibility. 178 However, there is evidence to suggest
that, at least over the medium or long term, several factors will combine
to improve the relative bargaining power of host countries to a point
where they will insert CSR provisions into bilateral investment treaties
thereby creating CSR norms that are both binding and enforceable.
Additionally, the local laws of host countries will be enforced in a way
that holds corporations accountable for their labor and environmental
practices. Both of these phenomena would essentially be the result of
increased host country bargaining power. The major factors potentially
leading to this potential increase are summarized below.
A. Increasing Demand for Comnmodities
The first factor leading to increased host country bargaining power
is the rapidly increasing demand for commodities. As evidence of this
demand increase, in 2010, cotton prices rose 92 percent, 79 coffee prices
rose 65 percent,18 0 and copper prices rose 30 percent.181 This increasing
demand comes in part from futures trading and global drought and

176. See Stiglitz, supra note 43, at 490; Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes

of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARVARD INT'L L. J. 435, 437 (2009) ("These concerns
about the integrity of investment treaty arbitration are worthy of consideration. Unfair
treatment of respondent states on the basis of whether they are part of the developed or
developing world raises tangible issues about the legitimacy and long-term viability of
arbitration. Similarly, if participants believe that a dispute's outcome depends in some
part upon whether an arbitrator comes from the developing or developed world, they may
question the procedural integrity of arbitration.").
177. Stiglitz, supra note 43, at 490.

178. Darren M. Springer, Reimagining the WTO: Application of the New Deal as
Means of Remedying Emerging Global Issues, 29 VT. L. REV. 1067, 1083 (2005).
179. Liam Pleven & Matt Wirz, Companies Stock Up as Commodity Prices Rise, WALL
ST.
J.,
Feb.
3,
2011,
http://online.wsj.comlarticle/SB10001424052748704
775604576120533736097682.html.
180. Why Are Commodity Prices Rising? Let Me Count the Ways, SEEKING ALPHA (Jan.
17, 2011), http://seekingalpha.com/article/246895-why-are-commodity-prices-rising-letme-count-the-ways.
181. Id.
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flooding, 182 but the primary driver of this global phenomenon comes
from a growing middle class in developing countries such as Brazil,
India, and China.183 This trend is only accelerating. According to
numbers compiled by the United Nations and Goldman Sachs, by 2030
China will have 1.4 billion middle class consumers and India will have
1.07 billion. 184 During the same time period, the middle classes of the
United States and Western Europe will be 365 million and 414 million,
respectively. 185

This demographic and macroeconomic shift benefits developing
countries because "[h]igher commodity prices act like a consumption
tax, transferring income from households and companies which use the
resources to companies and countries that produce them." 1 6 The
majority of commodities are produced in developing countries. For
example, 58.5 percent of the world's refined copper, 51.2 percent of the
world's aluminum, and 58.4 percent of the world's grains are produced
in the developing world. 187

Thus, both the fact of rising commodity prices and its cause - a
growing middle class in developing countries - suggest that developing
nations will have increased bargaining power at the negotiating table.
The argument that a multinational corporation who does not feel that it
is getting favorable enough terms can simply move to another
developing country and secure these terms is becoming a much less
tenable one. Over time, developing countries will come to appreciate
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183. See Nick Trevethan, Analysis: World Commodity Prices Poised to Gain on Rising
Yuan, REUTERS, Jan. 12, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/13/us-chinacommodities-yuan-idUSTRE70COU220110113 (noting that "[tihe volume of unwrought
copper was about the same in the two years, but the value of those imports rose 44
percent in 2010," and that "China consumed over 7.5 million tonnes of copper in 2010,
according to Reuters calculations, almost 40 percent of the world's refined output"); Paul
Krugman, Commodities: This Time is Different, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2011),
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/29/commodities-this-time-is-different/
("[It's
clear from news coverage that Chinese demand is driving the markets. As I and others
have been pointing out, we've got a bifurcated world right now, with advanced economies
still depressed but emerging economies in an inflationary boom; commodity prices are
reflecting the boom part of the picture.").
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this trend and use it as a bargaining chip in negotiations with home
countries and MNCs themselves.
B. The Persistence of the "Obsolescing Bargain"
The second factor leading host countries to a greater voice in CSR
extraction and
applies equally to the resource
compliance
manufacturing context and can be found in "the obsolescing bargain,"
an idea developed by Raymond Vernon in the early 1970's.188 The
obsolescing bargain says that, although MNCs have an initial
bargaining advantage over their host country, over time, the former's
bargaining power weakens vis-A-vis the latter.s 9
This change in
relative bargaining power is the result of several shifts that take place
as a MNC's foreign direct investment matures.
Initially, a high level of uncertainty characterizes an MNC's
relationship with a host country. Then, as the MNC begins to enjoy
success in the newly exploited market, the perception that the MNC's
high returns are justified by the risk weakens substantially, and the
host country will be less willing to offer the MNC such favorable terms
as the relationship progresses.190 As the MNC constructs immovable
assets in the host country, the MNC's ability to cease operations there
diminishes significantly due to the "sunk costs" represented by plants,
offices, and the development of human capital. 191 Over time, changes
within the host country itself lead to a shift in the relative bargaining
Essentially, the
positions of the MNC and the host government.
economic development that results from foreign direct investment leads
to increasing demands for social services.1 92 Under the initial contract
between the MNC and the host government, the corporation is able to
keep the bulk of its profits, leading to rapidly expanding corporate
coffers coupled with only a modest increase in government revenue. 193
This situation leads to dramatically increased pressure on the host
government to secure more favorable terms vis-A-vis the MNC in the
future.
To support this theory, an empirical, longitudinal study found that
the MNC's proportion of foreign ownership fell over time, regardless of
the existence of a colonial relationship between the host and home

188. See generally RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL
SPREAD OF U.S. ENTERPRISES (1971).
189. Robin F. Hansen, Multinational EnterprisePursuit of Minimized Liability: Law,
InternationalBusiness Theory and the Prestige Oil Spill, 26 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 410, 447
(2008).
190. Barbara Jenkins, Reexamining the "Obsolescing Bargain" A Study of Canada's
National Energy Program,40 INT'L ORG. 139, 141 (1986).
191. See Hansen, supra note 189, at 447.
192. Jenkins, supra note 190, at 141.
193. See id.
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countries or the identity of the home country.194 However, this study
found that the size of the firm was negatively correlated with foreign
ownership - the larger the firm, the more control the home country
retained over the venture.19 5 This suggests that a larger size results in
an increase in leverage over the host government that outweighs the
pressures of sunk costs upon the MNC. On balance though, time is
evidently on the side of the host country when it comes to relative
bargaining power.

C. Self-Determination in the Developing World
Lastly, the Arab Spring has the potential to lead to the
establishment of governments in the developing world that are less
willing to acquiesce to the demands of developed nations and more
responsive to the people. This final factor is more aspirational and less
economically inevitable than the first two but nonetheless has the
potential to play a major role in the proliferation of effectively binding
CSR norms. At their fullest potential, the democratic uprisings in the
Middle East and North Africa represent a new era in the developing
world - one in which the popular will of the people overcomes the selfinterested decisions of despots like Hosni Mubarak and Muammar
Ghaddafi. 196 When dealing with governments who respond to the needs
of its citizens, MNCs likely will be forced to account for the host country
conditions that norms of corporate social responsibility are meant to
address. In countries where these uprisings lead to stable institutions,
the Arab Spring may successfully pressure host governments to secure
more favorable terms for their citizens and pass and enforce laws and
regulations passed domestically.
Increased demand for commodities (including labor), the steady
long term effect of the obsolescing bargain, and the new emergence of
popular governance in the developing world will all lead to greater
bargaining power on the part of host government vis-A-vis MNCs and
their home governments. Taken together these three factors may lead
to an insistence on the part of host governments that their citizens are
protected to a degree never before seen. These phenomena would allow
for the regulation of multinational corporations without a need to
derogate from the state primacy model of international human rights
law or the shareholder primacy model of corporate law.

194. Sushil Vachani, Enhancing the Obsolescing Bargain Theory: A Longitudinal
Study of Foreign Ownership of U.S. and European Multinationals,26 J. INT'L Bus. STUD.
159, 174 (1995).
195. Id. at 175.
196. See generally Lisa Anderson, Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the
Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, 90 FOREIGN AFF., no. 3, May-June 2011,
at 2, 2-6.
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This development, if it is to occur at all, is likely to be a gradual
one. Renegotiation of bilateral investment treaties is not an every day
occurrence, and the transformation of a society towards democratic
governance is even rarer. Such a tectonic shift will undoubtedly take
time. When one considers the severe doctrinal barriers to creating noncontractual binding legal norms, however, the relative efficacy and
efficiency of the introduction of contractually based or domestically
enforced norms begin to seem both more appealing and more realistic.
While the already-tried mechanisms for ensuring corporate
compliance with widely-accepted CSR norms have done an outstanding
job shaping corporate behavior around the edges, the most serious
violators will almost certainly respond only to coercive, binding, and
enforceable measures. Over the medium and long term, these coercive
measures are much more likely to come in the form of BIT clauses or
domestic regulation driven by macroeconomic and political factors than
through the emergence of new, independently binding legal norms,
especially those devised and implemented by MNCs themselves and
then adopted by governmentally-sanctioned courts.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The principle of equity lies at the heart of the lex mercatorianorms.
Even if lex mercatorianorms did not create independently binding legal
norms in a traditional court, the principles emerged organically as a
direct result of the fact that the mercantile community saw each other
as equals and treated each other accordingly. They saw equity as a goal
to be sought in and of itself throughout the mercantile community.
Today, a different economic paradigm prevails in which parties seek
only achieve the best result possible for themselves. That result is
deemed equitable, regardless of the actual contents or broader
consequences of the agreement, because it was created as the result of a
bargain in the free market, which is viewed as a sort of natural state.
This creates a community that looks nothing like the mercantile
community in which lex mercatoria norms developed; if medieval
merchants dealt with one another then the way that many
multinational corporations deal with developing nations today, lex
mercatorianorms may not have developed at all.
In the end, medieval merchants developed lex mercatoria norms
because it helped their bottom line and minimized potential liability.
They allowed themselves to be bound by the norms because they saw
each other as relative equals. Because neither of these conditions exist
with regards to developing nations and the worst corporate abusers,
enforceable norms of corporate social responsibility will ultimately
develop outside of the corporate suite and be implemented
independently of the corporation itself. To argue otherwise is to
romanticize the corporation and to ignore the need for outside pressure
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in order for meaningful norms to develop. A more realistic approach
must prevail.

